The EU Countries Face Numerous Military Capability Gaps

This conclusion is made by a big team of European security experts from leading think tanks: the Centre for European Policy Studies, Institute for European Policymaking, Royal United Services Institute, and Clingendael. Their analysis of the European defense development problems has resulted in a common report entitled More Europe in Defence – Three Pathways.

Combined military spending by EU Member States has risen from EUR 234 billion in 2020 to EUR 381 billion in 2025, i.e. nearly by 63 percent. UK defense spending rose from EUR 52.5 billion in 2020 to EUR 76.7 billion in 2025 – by 46 percent. Discounted for inflation, growth accounted to 1.5–2.1 percent of GDP in 2025. Investment has doubled since 2022, amounting to about EUR 100 billion in 2024, or 30% of total defense spending.

Funding is only a means to an end, not an end in itself. Despite the sudden jump in spending, investments do not translate directly into meaningful fighting power.

With so much cash flowing into defense, countries are incentivized to promote national manufacturers, which hinders pan-European procurement. Even though European countries know at a rational level that it is inefficient and outright wasteful to direct their defense expenditure to their national industries, and often declare that they should combine their financial power, the juste retour reflex nonetheless remains strong. Elected politicians will always prefer to direct resources first and foremost to their own constituencies. But inefficient and fragmented defense expenditure weakens the overarching aim of a stronger and more secure Europe.

The EU’s military capability gaps stem from historic overreliance on the US, underinvestment in core capabilities, a post-Cold War focus on expeditionary operations and inefficient procurement practices.

European allies are still facing critical deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. European armies lack the readiness needed to sustain high-intensity warfare. Many units remain undermanned, underequipped and insufficiently prepared for rapid deployment and sustained operations. Force regeneration plans, essential for replacing frontline losses, have largely been neglected since the Cold War and have yet to be reestablished.

Despite sustained efforts to increase military mobility, the ability to move

troops and equipment rapidly across Europe remains constrained without the USA. The transport infrastructure (air, rail, road and sea) needs to be adapted for rapid movement. The investment required is EUR 70 billion.

Europe's technology lag results from decades of underspending on military research and development. US military R&D spending has been more than 10 times higher than the European total. In 2024, the USA spent about USD 100 billion on advancing military systems, against less than USD 10 billion by Europe.

It is at present very difficult to estimate the hardware requirements even a few years ahead. Tactical adaption cycles in Ukraine are between six and eight weeks; hence, it is problematic for Europeans to set requirements for capabilities that usually take years to develop and procure, possibly making them obsolete on delivery.

Rapid progress can be made in low- to middle-tech areas where Europe has industrial strengths. Yet progress in high-tech fields like space and anti-missile defense require more time and collective solutions due to their cost and complexity.

Without swift progress in closing these gaps, Europe will remain heavily reliant on the USA. This dependency ties the continent’s security to Washington’s political will and strategic priorities. Europe might take 10 to 12 years to replace vital military capabilities provided by the USA.

Source: https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/more-europe-in-defence-three-pathways/