Time Is on Russia’s Side, Not on Europe’s

What is the future of NATO’s deterrence in the air domain without U.S. support?

The European NATO countries are facing a serious problem. They must determine how to uphold the NATO mission as military support from Washington declines and U.S. resources shift to the Indo-Pacific. This applies especially to the allied air forces that remain fatally dependent on U.S. enabling capabilities.

The matter is discussed in an analytical report by Edward Brady, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. The central question he asks is: ‘What capabilities must European NATO airpower possess – without U.S. operational support – to deter and, if necessary, defeat a possible Russian aggression?’

According to Edward Brady, European allies must assume reduced U.S. availability during crisis. This is not a political judgment but a resource allocation reality. Against this backdrop, allied planning must account for variability in the scale and immediacy of US operational participation.

Europe, most reluctant to lose American assistance, believes that for now allied force design should assume continued U.S. partnership but not unlimited U.S. capacity. Planning must incorporate flexibility in access to U.S.-produced systems, sustainment pipelines, and high-end enablers.

In this respect, time is not on the Europeans’ side. Russian reconstitution timelines are likely short, as Moscow has operated on a wartime industrial footing for several years. And most European States remain structured for peacetime production with limited surge capacity.

While precise contingencies are unknowable, four operational problems define the core demands on NATO airpower.

Problem 1: Providing sustained airspace protection and facilitating appropriate responses against ambiguous activities on all NATO flanks.

Problem 2: Defending people and critical infrastructure from air attack in the case of a possible conflict with Russia.

Problem 3: Penetrating the Russian integrated air defense system to strike high-value targets.

Problem 4: Establishing temporary, regional air superiority to enable air packages to be brought to bear against Russian surface forces or other targets.

The recommended actions fall into three interconnected layers. Foundational investments – industrial capacity, personnel development, and financial allocation – determine whether European airpower can scale over time. Institutional investments – command and control, sensing networks, stockpiles, and base resilience – determine whether NATO can generate and sustain combat power. Operational investments – counter-air mass, strike capacity, air mobility, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – determine whether the Alliance can produce battlefield effects.

In the short term, the priority should be mitigating risk by strengthening existing capabilities and improving interoperability across the Alliance. In the medium term, European allies must invest in structural reforms and capacity expansion that enable NATO airpower to operate effectively, even under conditions of reduced U.S. support.

As has already been said, the key constraint under any scenario is time. The Russian economy is already on a wartime footing, and Europe is still far from this. And America’s interest in its European allies shrinks with every passing month.

Source: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-future-of-natos-deterrence-in-the-air-domain/