France Offers Europe ‘Forward Deterrence’ but Remains the Sole Decision-Maker

In his article entitled How does France’s nuclear deterrent contribute to the defense of Europe?, Jean-Louis Lozier, a retired vice-admiral and high-ranking member of the French General Staff, examines in detail the new concept of ‘forward nuclear deterrence’ announced by French President Emmanuel Macron on 2 March 2026 in his speech at the Île Longue submarine base. He highlights that French nuclear power has always had a European dimension – as recognized back in 1974 at the NATO summit in Ottawa, – and now this dimension should be made more explicit via bilateral formats of cooperation with interested countries.

The article’s outwardly measured and confident tone conceals a serious gap between ambition and real capability. France offers its partners participation in strategic air forces’ exercises, joint demonstrations of resolve, and even ad hoc deployment of nuclear-equipped Rafale fighters at allies’ airbases, with Paris clearly retaining its exclusive decision-making authority. This is not deterrent sharing, nor transfer of control. This is an attempt to make French nuclear power more visible to allies and adversaries without renouncing full national sovereignty.

An asymmetry that has existed for decades is visibly manifested here. The author himself recognizes that after the Cold War most European countries preferred to rely on the extended U.S. umbrella precisely because they deemed the French one insufficient to protect anybody but France. Now, amid doubts about U.S. reliability, eight or nine countries (Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Greece, Denmark, and then Norway) have expressed their interest. However, interest is certainly far from willingness to entirely rely on the French guarantees. The French arsenal remains relatively small compared to the U.S. and Russian ones. The doctrine provides for no limited nuclear warfare and for quick escalation to extreme measures. In a situation where the adversary may try to test thresholds from below – using hybrid attacks, massive drone strikes or ballistic missiles, – such deterrence could prove too harsh a tool that is hardly usable.

In reality, the concept looks like an attempt by France to strengthen its European security leadership without losing sovereignty. Bilateral formats help bypass slow and complicated negotiation within the European Union and NATO. On the other hand, they create fragmentation risks: different countries will have varying degrees of attachment to the French doctrine. The UK-France nuclear dialogue, reinforced by the 2025 Northwood Declaration, remains the only process that has really advanced by now. And even this is limited by the UK’s strong technological and manufacturing dependence on the United States.

The author examines in detail the historic progress of French nuclear power: from General de Gaulle’s decision on full independence, through the recognition of the European dimension in the 1970s and an unsuccessful attempt at ‘concerted deterrence’ with Germany in 1995, to gradual rapprochement with Britain. He rightly notes that after the end of the Cold War European partners’ interest in the French deterrence was minimal. Only a rapidly degrading strategic environment and doubts about U.S. guarantees made the French proposition relevant again.

The oddest thing is that Europe is again being offered a ‘European’ solution that in fact remains purely national. President Macron mentions the need to build a new security architecture in which Europe will be a subject, not an object. Yet while French nuclear power remains exclusively French, and European partners merely join signaling actions and exercises, the real shift in the power balance is minimal. Europe gets more rhetoric about solidarity and European responsibility but fewer real common tools and common solutions.

Besides, the author touches upon the issue of conflicts below the nuclear threshold. He admits that hybrid threats, drone attacks and ballistic missile strikes call for the development of early warning, air and missile defense, and long-range conventional weapons. These are really essential – but require huge resources and coordination, none of which Europe possesses to the extent required.

The article is a good account of the French proposal’s limits. Forward deterrence could strengthen signals, complicate the adversary’s calculations and give some European countries an extra sense of protection. Yet it fails to eliminate the fundamental problem: Europe is still dependent on decisions to be taken by the president of one country. Unless and until this changes, any talk about a European nuclear dimension will remain more an attempt to adapt to weakening transatlantic guarantees than building a true common defense. France offers Europe an umbrella but retains control over it. And this is the principal constraint of the entire affair.

Original publication: https://www.ethikundmilitaer.de/en/magazine-datenbank/detail/01-2026/article/how-does-frances-nuclear-deterrent-contribute-to-the-defense-of-europe