Optimism About EU Enlargement Out of Tune with Shifting Sentiment in Europe

In an article published in Internationale Politik Quarterly, Milan Nič, senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, inquires into the issues and risks involved in EU enlargement.

The European Council will meet on 15 and 16 October 2026. The first day will be devoted to EU enlargement. And back on 4 September, at an informal get-together of the EU’s European affairs ministers in Dublin, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos stated optimistically, ‘The autumn of enlargement is coming’.

This outward optimism was intended to lighten the mood dampened by the loss of the Iceland referendum on opening up negotiations about joining the EU and ahead of a potential victory of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in a regional election in Germany.

Yet she was out of tune with the shifting political mood across Europe. The ultimate risk is the outcome of French presidential elections in April and May next year: If Marine Le Pen of the Rassemblement National (RN) party wins, it could lead to a complete shake-up of the EU’s political and budget architecture, never mind sensitive policies such as EU enlargement. Moreover, there will be national elections in almost a third of EU member States, including Italy, Spain, and Poland in the course of next year.

What can be achieved before spring 2027 should be more or less clear by the end of the next EU summit in mid-October, which is set to hold strategic discussions among leaders on enlargement and institutional reform.

The idea is to agree on some simplifications along the long way of accession talks for the current eight candidate countries – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia (some of which have been negotiating membership for over a decade) as well as more recent ones Moldova and Ukraine

However, the issue of granting special status to Ukraine is not raised. At the October EU summit, the sensitive discussion about a ‘special path’ for Ukraine is unlikely to take center stage. It’s more likely that it will be shelved.

In respect of Ukraine, there is now less urgency for a fast-track accession plan. The peace talks with Russia, in which accession was to play a role, have not materialized and are unlikely to do so in the near future. Vladimir Putin escalates his war against Ukraine. To the EU leaders, this means less urgency to agree the parameters of Ukraine’s special EU accession path.

When German chancellor Friedrich Merz, in a May letter to EU leaders, suggested granting provisional ‘associate membership’ to Ukraine which would allow it to attend EU meetings without voting rights, this was negatively perceived in key EU capitals and Kyiv alike.

A core argument behind Merz’ letter was that a wartime Ukraine needs an immediate political anchor in Brussels, based on some innovative solution beyond standard enlargement. The idea, however, was met with strong criticism and resistance in Ukraine, where it was perceived as a potential ‘waiting room’ trap, diluting the pledge of full membership.

Given the latest developments in Germany, though, there is the question of whether a politically weakened Merz will still have enough sway to push for agreements. The window of opportunity to enlarge the EU is very narrow. The alternative is a politically paralyzed enlargement process, which will invite greater instability in EU’s immediate neighborhood.

Original publication: https://ip-quarterly.com/en/narrow-window-opportunity